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ABSTRACT: 
Sen's capability approach (SCA) has suppo1ied valuable work on Human De-
velopment (HD), bringing attention to a much wider range of information on people's 
freedoms and well-being than in most earlier economie planning, but has troubling 
features and requires modification and enrichment. The paper first identifies the ap-
proach' s components, the contributions of the HD Reports, and the doubts whether 
SCA has sufficient conception of human personhood to sustain work on HD beyond 
finding indices superior to GDP. It then examines SCA's central concepts. The con-
cepts of capability and functioning lead us to consider both possibilities and outcomes, 
but their definition and use has been confusing. Besides Sen's opportunity concept of 
'capability' we must distinguish skills and potentials; and distinguish levels and types 
of 'functioning'. To understand both consumerism and what can motivate and drive 
more humanly fulfilling development, we must elaborate different aspects and sources 
of 'well-being' and the content and requirements of 'agency', more than in Sen's cho-
sen strategy. SCA's priority category of opportunity-capability must be read as a meas-
ure of personal advantage relevant in many public policy situations, rather than as a 
theory of well-being; and its concept of freedom must be partnered by concepts of rea-
son and need. 
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1. A PUZZLE AND ITS POSSIBLE RESOLUTION 
Amartya Sen's work in welfare theory and the conceptualization of human de-
velopment is remarkable for having combined critique of a major area of mainstream 
economics-welfare economics-with several further steps: elaboration and communica-
tion of the Capability Approach (CA), a humanist alternative theory \vhich has been 
\Videly accessible and adopted, led to much empirical work and had significant policy 
impact.2 It has been central to the Human Development Reports series (HDRs) 
launched for UNDP by Sen's close associate the late Mahbub ul Haq, and has subse-
quently influenced policy changes in the World Bank in the Wolfensohn era. 
A puzzle arises. The capability approach has been fruitful and the HDRs are in 
many respects an important advance on earlier mainstream treatments of development. 
Y et viewed from outside economics CA seems primitive in some ways, insufficient as a 
theory of \vell-being, and hardly a theory of the 'human' in human development (HD). 
Amongst possible weaknesses are: its extreme emphasis on choice; obscurities in key 
concepts; and its emergence from a dialogue between economics and philosophy with-
out much involvement from psychology, sociology and anthropology. 
Human life is too complex to capture by a slogan that development is 'a process 
of enlarging human choices' (HDR 1990, p. 1 O, and several later HDRs). With the 
elaboration of the HD concept, more indicators have been added to reflect other dimen-
sions, straining or going beyond CA's language. This limitation concerns the ambition 
of the claims sometimes made in CA, and can be remedied by reducing their strength. 
More fundamental are possible \Veaknesses in the clarity, coherence or realism of 
CA's other components. (Where necessary we will distinguish Sen's version by the ac-
ronym SCA.) The Capability-Functionings (C-F) conceptualization serves well to cri-
tique conventional welfare economics or the focus on GNP, but appears an insufficient 
basis for a whole theory of human development. Examination of the centrai concepts in 
SCA-functionings, capabilities and (positive) freedom, agency, and well-being-re-
veals some obscurities and question marks, as we will see in Sections 4 through 6. 
General concepts cannot be perfect but there is scope here for clarification and refine-
ment. 
More fundamental still, and germane to the needed refinement, relatively little 
theory of being, of being human, seems to underlie SCA's proffered perspective on 
2 See Pressman & Summerfield (2000) fora useful overview and an invaluable bibliography. 
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1rel!-being; except fora discourse of freedom, seen primarily as choice. The connection 
to other strands in social science is still limited, though increasing ( e.g. Sen, 2000a). 
Even the fine volume on The Quality of Life from the UN's WIDER institute (Nuss-
baum & Sen, 1993) represents very largely a conversation amongst economists and 
Anglo-American philosophers. This gap may mirror the insouciance of welfare eco-
nomics, out of which SCA originally grew. Are psychologists, anthropologists and 
other disciplines still largely absent while economists build square wheels? Did SCA's 
very success in being adopted by UNDP help to freeze it prematurely? 
I will suggest that we respond to the puzzle of CA's considerable influence yet 
paiily problematic components by being more precise on what CA is useful for and for 
whom, and on where it does not suffice. As prelude, Section 2 specifies the contents 
and nature of Sen's CA project, as major intellectual basis for the UN HDRs. Section 3 
then looks at the role of the HDR work in focusing and broadening attenti on to the pur-
poses of development and dethroning economie growth as centrepiece. (It does not try 
to cover Sen's or the HDRs' policy model for human development, and for example 
issues of the long-run relations between macro-economie liberalism and humanized 
public action.) It notes the furore around the Human Development Indices, which re-
flected the vested intellectual interests which Sen has helped to destabilize. CA pro-
vides an advance over mainstream economie welfare criteria (MEWC) and the 
overvaluation of GDP.3 To be operational, simplified versions are needed, notably the 
indices, and CA's simplified versions surpass MEWC (viz. GNP, GDP, etc.). However, 
SCA's role is to displace MEWC, not to be a new supposedly sufficient, all-purpose 
conception. For it does not suffice as a theory of well-being or a conceptualization of 
human development. When we assess it for those purposes, we ask for more than when 
within the bounds and conventions of welfare economi es. 
A deeper criticism then than the limits of the HD indices has been the claim that 
the Human Development work is not adequately human. Sections 4, 5 and 6 consider 
3 As Lipsey (2001) observes, mainstream economie discussion is in practice utilitarian more than Pare-
tian. Interpersonal comparisons are made openly or implicitly, typically using people's purchasing-
powers as weights, via adoption ofthe principle ofpotential compensation, as for example in cost-benefit 
ana!ysis: if gainers could compensate Iosers then a change is judged an improvement, regardless of 
whether compensation is actually made. Hence GDP dominates. Compensation and distribution are 
deemed politica! issues, beyond economics; if compensation is not made then it is assumed to have been 
politically judged as unjustified, e.g. on grounds that the rules of the game are utilitarian. This calculus 
informs economie policy and planning more than does Paretian welfare theory on the supposed impossi-
bility of interpersonal comparisons etc. 
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possible problems in Sen's concepts: of capability and functioning; \Vell-being, agency 
and personhood; and freedom. His schema surpasses mainstream economics' view of 
human personhood by adding independent weight to freedorn; and by downgrading the 
nomrntive weight of 'utility' interpreted as a feeling of happiness. It provides spaces for 
enriching economics, and has generated a valuable corresponding research programme. 
But it is insufficiently refined to be the sole or predominant base for human develop-
ment theory. Steps of great significance in the context of economics are less impressive 
in a wider context. Sen's approach remains with a thinnish conception of personhood, 
which can then contribute to: thin analyses of well-being; insufficient resistance to con-
sumerism; still margina! assigned roles for sympathy and commitment to others; and a 
somewhat idealized conception of freedom. The criticisms apply especially to some of 
Sen's disciples, less sensitive to SCA's limits than is Sen hirnself. 
The paper concludes with suggestions on where Sen's CA helps and where it is 
inadequate, and on additional and alternative bases for work on human development. 
HD theory exceeds SCA, increasingly so. We must go beyond clarifying where SCA 
makes its contributions, to consider ho\V to enrich or surpass SCA to make an HD the-
ory that is more widely adequate and can appeal to wider audiences. Ul Haq stressed 
(1998, pp. 228-9) that after a first phase in which the HD school met with irritated re-
sistance and a second phase of uncritical acceptance, we require a third phase of critica! 
evaluation. The same applies for its CA partner. 
2. THE CAPABILITY APPROACH 
Sen's capability approach includes at least components 1 to 5 below, in de-
creasing order of centrality, and increasingly also number 6. Number 7 is penumbral, 
and numbers 8 and 9 lie outside his version. 
• Component 1: A stance on information. There are many more types of information 
relevant in assessing welfare than the few-people's incomes, assets, and utility 
(levels of satisfaction or preference-fulfilment)-traditionally considered by main-
stream economics. Centrally, \Ve should also look at how people actually live, and 
at the freedom they have to choose how they live. In contrast, through to the l 980s 
even the UN had defined development in terms of GDP per capita, plus from the 
l 980s also in terms of the capacity for its long term grovv1h (Simonis, 1992). 
• Component 2: A specific set of categories, a language. Sen added severa! con-
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cepts-capabilities, functionings, agency, sympathy, commitment, quality of life-
to those conventional in micro- and welfare economics: incarne, goods, and utility. 
One could list each of these concepts as a distinct component of SCA, but since 
they are a linked set, \Ve treat them here as such, as a language. Fzmctionings are 
various components or aspects of how a person lives. Together a set (vector, or n-
tuple) of functionings makes up a person's life. A person's capability (capability 
set) is the set of alternative functionings vectors she could attain, in other words the 
extent of her positive freedom. Figure 1 shows basic interrelations of these con-
cepts. It is still a simplification; e.g., there can be feedbacks from functionings to 
skill-capabilities (Elson 1997 discusses work that disables). 
Figure 2 highlights two parts of the conceptual system: the distinctions between 
potential and achievement, or capability and functioning; and between own well-
being and the agent's fuller set of objectives. Sen argues that the fuller information 
\Ve require includes not only how much persona! well-being agents achieve but 
what they were free to achieve, and that we consider each of these cases both in 
terms of the agent's actual objectives and their persona! \Yell-being. 
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Figure 1: From Resources through to quality oflife -
Sen's Enlargement ofMicro-Economics 
QUALITY OF LIFE of an individuai 
(which reflects more than the well-being of the individuai) 
OWN WELL-BEING (WB) ~ [sympathy1 
[Thr_;;.Jypes of interpret
1
ation of WB: (A), (B), (C)l__ 
Other factors than own WB 
- including WB of others, 
and agent's other purposes 
,,---------~~ ~-~~---~-~ 
(A) Preference 
fulfilment 
&lor (B) Satisfaction 
/Happiness 
&lor (C) Own WB as judged 
by other criteria 4'<'----
(inc. capabs. & functgs.) 
FUNCTIONINGS (actual attained vector of functionings) 
1-----i use of one's capabilities, to do and be 
fAPABILITIES}-- I. 0-CAPABILITIES =set ofattainable functionings vectors 
2. S-CAPABILITIES = skills, owers, abilities 
process of generation of 0-( options) and S-( skills) capabilities from goods; 
depends on CHARACTERISTICS OF THE Il'ìDIVIDUAL, including S-&-P-) 
(potential) capabilities, and other features 
CHAR.\.CTERISTICS OF GOODS ACQUIRED i 
[ GOODS ( & Services; incl. Commodities) = actual acquisitions l 
I\ 
I process of acquisition of goods, which may reflect Choice, which I I may reflect Preference, which may reflect ethical Valuation. 
(EXCHANGE) ENTITLEMENT =set of initially attainable goods vectors; which then via actually 
attained incarne (=real incarne= mainstream econornics' definition of Standard of Living) leads to 
flCtUaJ flCOllÌSition of croons 
I\ 
; Entitlernent Mapping I 
l 
[ ENDOWMENTS I : influenced by Entitlement Relations I 
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Others' 
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Figure 2: Sen's categories for ranking a person's situation 
In terms of an agent 's In terms of the agent 's 
versonal well-beinz obiectives 
Actual (Own) Well-Being Agency Achievement 
achievement Achievement (WBA) (AA) 
Potentialfor (Own) Well-Being Agency Freedom 
attainment Freedom (WBF) (AF) 
SCA is known for its focus on well-being freedom, which is its primary category of 
capability. But it is also concemed ('though not with equal reach' [Sen, 1993, p. 
49]) with agency freedom, the agent's ability to impact on all her values, including 
those for other people and those which bring no personal well-being. Income is one 
measure of this agency freedom (AF), albeit very imperfect.4 
• Component 3: A stance concerning which levels, notably capability, have ethical 
priority. When prioritizing, Sen argues not for: (i) goods/commodities (G), because 
people have different needs; nor for (ii) (solely) utilities (U)-feelings of 
satisfaction, or the fact of preference fulfilment-because pref erences may be 
unconsidered or have been formed under situations of deprivation of information 
and of options. He advocates that we stress instead (iii) (valued) functionings (F), 
how people actually live, and in order to emphasize freedom especially (iv) 
(valued) capability (C), the set of vectors of functionings a person can attain: the 
actual life choices the person faces. He seems to propose this priority ranking: 1 -
C; 2 - F; 3 - U; 4 - G.5 This normative priority to capability has limitations, and 
might best be interpreted as a policy rule to 'let people make their O\Vn mistakes' 
rather than as an evaluative rule that 'capabilities really are more valuable than 
functionings'. CA can already be seen as especially a policy exercise, since it has 
diverged from U, people's own utility measures of welfare. We can therefore 
distinguish as a separable fourth component: 
• Component 4: Priority to capability/capabilities as a policy rule. Capability (WBF) 
is here seen as an appropriate measure of advantage rather than of well-being 
4 In Figure 1, agency in the ordinary sense is seen in the acquisition and use of income and goods, and 
the use of capabilities. In the sense of pursuit of an agent's objectives it is reflected both in the box 'Own 
\VB', insofar as own well-being falls within the objectives, and the box 'Other factors than own \VB', 
insofar as the agent has other objectives. 
5 See e.g. Sen (l 999b ): pp. 3, 75-6. Insofar as CA recognizes more than one relevant leve], decision-
making requires complex plural rules; see component 6. 
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(WBA), though it might contribute to \\'ell-being. In contrast, Functionings much 
more concern well-being. The very term 'functioning' matches 'being' better than 
does 'capability'. N ext come a seri es of competing-cum-complementary approaches 
to determining how and whìch capabilities should be prioritized. 
• Component 5: A principle akin to consumer sovereignty, namely that priority 
capabilities are those which 'people have reason to value' (see e.g. HDR 1998, p.40). 
Having distanced itself from felt utility and preference :fulfilment, SCA re-admits 
preferences here, but with a stress on inforn1ed and educated preferences about 
capabilities. Since it works at a policy level with a capability currency, how SCA 
operationalizes this idea is not obvious; hence the addition of component 6. 
• Component 6: Public procedures for prioritizing and threshold-setting. Alkire notes 
that SCA incorporates a stress on public discussion and decision procedures for 
prioritizing which and whose capabilities. This is for where Sen's criterion of 
'whatevcr people have reason to value' in individual deliberations àoes not suffice; 
and acts as prelude, partner and postlude to it. Nussbaum also stresses such 
procedures, in specifying, interpreting and applying constitutional rights in a polity, 
and when working beyond them. 
• Component 7: In practice, Sen and the HDRs use also notions of basic capabilities 
(basi e for survival or dignity) and required thresholds ( e.g. Anand & Sen, 2000, p. 
85; or in the HDRs' specification of equity). While these notions are ones most 
people find reason to value, component 8 guards against those cases where agents' 
reason instead leads to behaviour damaging to the agents or to others. Prioritization 
here remains however largely inexplicit and deliberately incomplete in Sen, who 
has eschewed a systematized list with universal pretensions. Component 7 reduces 
to component 6 if 'basic' is only a label for the priorities chosen through component 
6's procedures \vithin a particular politica! community. 
• Component 8 is an extended version of Component 7: A forma! list of priority 
capabilities. This is explicit and emphatic in Nussbaum and some other authors, and 
in the Declaration of Human Rights. For Nussbaum her list provides a basis for 
universal declarations of rights, whose precise local meanings remain however to be 
formulated, and for national constitutionally entrenched rights. Component 8 can 
thus be part of a particular sort of constrained public prioritization procedure. Sen's 
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recent partial convergence with the human rights approach may bring him closer to 
it. 
• Component 9 is a monotheistic, stronger version of component 3, not part of SCA 
but quite widespread in HD literature: a proposal that we should look only at the 
capability leve! (e.g. 'development is the expansion of capabilities'). This slogan 
does not suffice as a theory of welfare or as a policy rule. 
2.1 Real abilities, real humans, real development? 
With the categories of functionings and capabilities, and of basic requirements, 
Sen moves towards a picture of human life which could give a fitter welfare economics. 
He provides a system which has a careful philosophical basis, and that accomodates, 
justifies and link:s a wide range of concems, far wider than those subsumable under the 
economics category of real incarne (Sen, 2000b ). It thus integrates the earlier work on 
social indicators, basic needs and poverty assessment, and stimulates much additional 
work (see e.g. Alkire, Comim & Qizilbash, 2002). Sen retains though an abstracted 
conception of choice. Abstraction from incidentals is necessary; abstraction from es-
sentials is disastrous. Does SCA abstract from essentials? Does it retain restricted dis-
ciplinary habits? And if so, can it be reformed? 
The content and assumptions of Sen's work reflect that he is engaged in a con-
versation with economists and analytic philosophers, as a member of both groups. He 
proceeds in ways which are accessible and credible to mainstream economists, his 
origina! and main reference group, and retains most of their assumptions and style; thus 
he omits for example much substantive discussion ofthe content of processes of choice. 
This style can feel abstract and empty to many from other disciplines and pro-
fessions. Its theory of well-being still rests on the basis of relatively little explicit con-
sideration of being; nor, as a result, has it an explicit and elaborated theory of the good. 
There is a contrast here in both respects with Nussbaum. Her CA is richer and even so 
is incomplete compared to material from psychology about what brings people satis-
factions. The HDRs too have, as we will see, a fuller conception of being than do Sen's 
formal writings. 
Sen's approach has wide appeal, however, since it seems a feasible way forward 
both to some mainstream economists and some critics. It offers a clear improvement, 
with more of a theory of being than in mainstream economi es but not so much as to en-
8 
danger the device of aggregate indices orto lose the economist audience. Further, while 
the formal core of his approach is conceived and expressed in the stripped-down ab-
stract style, Sen uses richer cases for motivation, illustration, testing and application. 
He talks about specific people, real or imagined: he adds the philosopher's imaginable 
case and the administrator's real case to the economist's individual depleted of all per-
sonality other than appetite, volition and powers of calculation (Gasper, 2000a; van 
Staveren, 2001 ). 
Sen has consciously stayed apart from the more substantive formulations of 
human potentials, requirements and personality by basic human needs theorists and 
Nussbaum. Those perhaps cannot be formalized in the \Vays required by his style, but 
he also fears essentialism and cultural parochialism. However the possible price for 
distance from more substantive work on the meaning, contents and requirements of 
human-as opposed to human resource-<levelopment is a series of limitations, as 
claimed by various authors: 
1. Sen's concepts of functioning, capability and capabilities are sometimes obscure. 
2. His conceptions of well-being and agency are problematic and partake of some 
weaknesses of utilitarian psychology; \vhile his conception of personhood is very 
incomplete. 
3. His conception of freedom seems too focused on range of (valued) choice, and ne-
glectful of other aspects of being and need. 
\Ve consider these criticisms in tum in sections 4 to 6. Before that, Section 3 
presents the UN's Human Development approach which CA underpins and which has 
effectively challenged mainstream economie criteria, and looks at the objection that it 
is still not sufficiently human. 
3. THE UNDP 'HUMAN DEVELOPMENT' SCHOOL - CONTENTS AND 
CRITICISMS 
3.1 Emergence and ambitions of the UNDP HD work 
The 1990s Human Development Reports have provided a channel for alterna-
tive development thinking, through the Uniteci Nations system but \Vith an autonomous 
voice. They have a global perspective not only a focus on 'the South', unlike in the 
World Bank's so-called World Development Reports. They have gone beyond the 
1970s responses to the limits to trickledown from economie growth, by arguing that 
measures like directly investing to meet basic needs are not only growth-compatible but 
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can promote growth. Here they built on the perception of the centrality of 'human 
capita!' in growth and relateci lessons from the East Asian success stories. Building also 
from perceptions of low or declining quality of life in some rich or fast growing coun-
tries (ul Haq, 1998, Ch.3), they redefined human development as improvement in hu-
man well-being, and thus as more than human resource de\·elopment, the building of 
human capitai to support economie growth. People are not just the principal means but, 
even more important, the principal ends of development (Anand & Sen, 2000). Eco-
nomie growth must be seen as a means towards human development rather than human 
development as being for economie growth. 
The adjective 'human' in 'Human Development' thus conveys the suggestion 
that earlier economie development was not human-centred and that 'development' was 
in practice inadequately conceived and operationalized as economie growth. GNP was 
never suited to be a measure of well-being. It was designed to measure monetized activity, 
much of which represents lack of or loss of well-being; it excludes many other aspects of 
or influences on well-being (household work, family life, leisure, freedom, etc.; HDR 
1996, pp. 56-7); and it can conceal extreme deprivation for large parts of the population. 
Development should be reconceived as about decent human lives, not in tem1s of per cap-
ita GNP. 
Secondarily, the HD label evokes the 'Development of Humans'-Human Re-
source Development (HRD) and its functionality for economie advance-in other 
words a concem for 'human capitai', but now seen in a broader way. When Dreze & 
Sen (1995) for example stress the significance of basic educati on for economie grovv1h 
in India, even though retums are sometimes long delayed and even if India has plenty 
of qualified people for most immediate functions, they show how basic education also 
affects fundamental areas in state-society relations-including the ability to discipline 
govemment and other power centres-and the status of women, and hence much else, 
such as fertility pattems. 
At the same time, the HDRs bave not downplayed economie growth. Contrary 
to the impression given in for example Ravallion (1997), they have taken East Asia as 
their main model, not Kerala or pre-1977 Sri Lanka. The 1996 HDR held that while 
economie grovvth is neither sufficient for HD improvement nor necessary for it (the 
1980s and early 90s saw major HD improvements without fast or even any economie 
gro\\1h in many countries); yet sustained rapid HD both requires and is promoted by 
fast economie grow1h, amongst other requirements, and this combination is the ideal. 
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3.2 Meanings and indices of 'Human development' 
Development means widening the 'range of human choices', said Arthur Lewis 
in 1955 (cited by HDR 1996, p.46). Sen's capability approach and in tum the HDRs 
have adopted this conception: 'Human development can be expressed as a process of 
enlarging people's choices' (HDR 1996, p. 49; HDR 2000, p. 17). However, some op-
tions are undesired (like the option to become HIV positive) and some are insignificant 
(a thousandth variety of biscuits, say). Valued options are the relevant on es, stress the 
HDRs and Sen, who speak of 'people's capabilities to lead the lives they value' (HDR 
1996, p. 49), which includes avoidance of negatively valued options. This is a liberal 
position, \Vhich emphasises (individua!) freedom and people's own priorities, not only 
basic needs. It hopes those priorities are tolerable. 
Further qualifiers arise. The HD concept has expanded to encompass severa! 
dimensions (e.g. HDR 1996, pp. 55-6). In addition to (1) empowerment, the expansion 
of capabilities plus participation, are listed: (2) equity (in basic capabilities and oppor-
tunities; i.e. everyone should have at least a certain minimum leve! of opportunities); 
(3) sustainability (of 'people's opportunities to freely exercise their basic capabilities', 
!oc. cit.); ( 4) community membership, belonging; and (5) security. The concept has 
progressed beyond the soundbite phrase about enlarging people's choices; and, in its 
references to participation, community membership and security, now says more about 
which capabilities are centra!. 
To operationalize such a conception, UNDP essayed a series of measures to go 
beyond GDP per capita. It valuably presents many indicators rather than glorifying one 
(see e.g. UNDP HDRO, 1997). The most prominent, the Human Development Index, 
(HDI) was primarily originated by Sen and is based on: 1. mean longevity, 2. mean 
schooling and literacy, and 3. GDP/capita adjusted to reflect purchasing power. It is 
meant as an indicator of people's opportunities fora good life. Each ofthe three compo-
nents is meant to forma proxy measure fora range of areas of choice.6 
While accepting that income is only a means, the HDI uses GDP/capita as proxy 
for most other capabilities beyond survival, education and \Vhat those directly reflect 
(Anand & Sen, 2000). This is problematic. It also helped Ravallion and others to argue 
that such a high correlation exists between HDI and GDP/capita rankings that the HDI 
6 Since Jongevity and years in formai schooling do not directly measure choice, to Apthorpe HDI re-
mains 'a measure not ofhuman development, not ofhuman choice, but of human capitai' (1997, p. 24). 
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is superfluous. But even if GDP/capita (adjusted for price Ievels) were a good devel-
opment indicator in 90% of cases, one could not be satisfied, just as a good doctor 
would not decide from a medical indicator which is invalid in 10% of cases and/or fails 
for some very important cases ( cf. Brazil, Pakistan). Nor, even if there \Vere perfect cor-
relation-which is far from the case (Anand & Sen, 2000; UNDP HDRO, 1997)-could 
the conclusion be drawn that we can stick to GDP/capita. For the HDI only claims to be a 
simple indicator (not the concept itself) of part of the UNDP concept of human develop-
ment, the part that stresses possession of valued options.7 Tue severa! other dimensions of 
well-being may well not be positively correlated with GDP/capita. (See e.g. Apthorpe, 
1997, on Bhutan.) 
Another charge Ievelled at the HDI was of unnecessary and misleading aggre-
gation. But aggregation is essential to produce league tables, and these are required to 
capture attention-by showing the marked divergence in many cases of HDI ranking 
from GDP/capita ranking-and to thus focus thought on the inadequacies of GNP or 
GDP as a welfare measure and policy target (Streeten, 1995; Sen, 1999a). In all this the 
HDR work has succeeded and had a major influence in the enrichment of development 
policy debate and planning during the 1990s. The aggregation weights and value 
choices it uses are explicit and transparent (see the HDR technical appendices; and e.g. 
Anand & Sen, 2000), \vhereas the price weights which are used in market measures and 
often to make valuations in public policy are too often read as somehow representing 
no value choices. The HDR work makes the valuation and prioritization more open, 
and makes it clear that indicators are only indicators. No one has proposed HDI as a 
sufficient indicator for policy, unlike sometimes in the case of GNP. HDI serves instead 
mainly to weaken the primacy given to GNP. The summary indexes are not the core of 
the HD approach, but a counter to GNP and its associated presumptions and blind-
nesses. In a two-tier approach they are the !esser part, compared to the wealth of infor-
mation presented on varied aspects of human development (Anand & Sen, 2000); but 
they have stimulated work on better measures and disseminated HD concepts and crite-
ria. Sen originally disagreed with Mahbub ul Haq's judgements on the strategy and tac-
tics of producing inevitably simplified indexes. Now he warmly acknowledges ul Haq's 
wisdom here (Sen, 1999a & 2000b ). 
7 An index is a measure derived as a summary of component measures. An indicator is an (in generai) 
imperfect, proxy measure ofsome phenomenon. The HDI is both an index and an indicator. 
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3.3 Are the HDRs really 'human'? - or still too economistic? 
Mainstream economics' theory of well-being is not based on any explicit theory 
of, and evidence on, being. Indeed it does not deal in recognisable real human beings. Its 
conception of welfare is facused on the investor and the consumer of commodities: the 
whole of life viewed as a stock exchange or supem1arket. It is weak even on the satis-
factions from work and typically presumes, like a capitalist employer, that work is al-
\vays a cost. In his entitlement and capability approaches, Sen has helped to extend and 
transfarm that welfare conception, to include the ranges of valued options which people 
ha ve and the content of their lives. This step rests on a richer conception of personhood, 
including a centrai significance far freedom and a rejection of a single psychic currency 
of utility. Some economists overlook this structure in Sen's corpus.8 His Human De-
velopment work gains a compass and robustness from his underlying reconstruction of 
welfare theory, which in turn derives rationale and guidance from the rethinking of val-
ues and personhood in his philosophical work. 
Does this picture of human welfare, enriched as seen by the standards of eco-
nomics, suffice far our conception of human development ? Apthorpe, a well-knmm 
anthropological voice in development studies, queries the understanding of 'human' and 
'social' sho\m in the UNDP work. He argued that the global HD Reports have been 
dominated by economists-Sen, ul Haq, Streeten, Jolly, Stewai1, Anand and others-who 
have (again) considered themselves omnicompetent, because now 'human' too. In his 
view this reflects an economics-dominated world which the HDR economists othenvise 
sometimes criticize. \Vhile use of the tern1 'human' gives a warn1 feeling, it can divert 
from social and political analyses. Global generalities break dovm when we look at na-
tional and locai situations with their specific institutions, groups and cultures. The 'social 
indicators' used are demographic and sectoral, never about social institutions, social 
structures, or groups' own social categories (Apthorpe, 1997, p. 27). He hoped the new 
wave of national HDRs would get closer to these realities, and gave suggestions far richer 
and more self-aware styles of description: 'To merit further credibility they will.. have to 
be much stronger on social and economie and cultura! description than are the present 
HDRs: traders must be brought in as well as trade, farmers as \vell as farms, educators as 
8 See for example the commentaries on Sen's work by three leading Indian economists (Prabhat Patnaik, 
Tapas Majumdar and Kaushik Basu) in Economie and Politica! Weekly (Mumbai; November 7 and De-
cember 12, 1998). In contrast, Pranab Bardhan (November 7) and A.K. Bagchi (December 5) present the 
connections. 
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well as education .. .' (1997, p. 23). Given the HDRs' commitment to economie growth, and 
their abstracted sense of 'human', some critics see them as in practice a school ofhumaner 
economie development, rather than of development of and by humans. 
Let us examine the attention to human be-ing in the underlying capability ap-
proach created by Sen. It represents an increase in attention compared to mainstream 
economics, but is it enough? Enough for what? 
4. FUNCTIONINGS, CAPABILITY AND CAPABILITIES 
Let us start with the term 'capability', the chosen banner. It marks a family of 
concepts central to practically oriented discussion of ethics and politics. The philoso-
pher Onora O'Neill for example makes intensive, and largely interchangeable, use of 
the terms 'capacities' and 'capabilities' in her construction of a realistically grounded 
modem cosmopolitan ethic (O'Neill, 1996, 2000). 'Capability' here generally has an 
everyday meaning: capacity, skill, ability, aptitude; we can call this S-capability (S for 
skill and substantive; Gasper, 1997). It is the sense that O'Neill seems to rely on when 
she talks of 'capabilities for action', 'capaciti es to reason', 'capacities to comply', 
commercial, cognitive and social capacities, and so on. 
Sen has taken a more abstract meaning of capability: the set of life-paths attain-
able for a given person.9 We can call it 0-capability (O for options and opportunities; 
'options' seems aptest, and suitably economie; the usage is also akin to 'military capa-
bility'). But Sen still trades on the-appealing, more human-connotations of S-
capability, perhaps because he aims to also communicate to and influence wider audi-
ences. He dropped the label 'capabilities approach' in favour of 'capability approach', 
but still writes of 'capabilities' in more everyday ways, and when referring to sub-sets 
or particular attainable functionings in the capability set, or to the options to attain 
them. 
The word 'capability' comes in routine CA and HDR use to cover any specific 
thing a person can do, be or have, and thereby loses distinctiveness. Thus health is 
called both a functioning and a [O-] capability (an attainable functioning). The 1999 
HDR designates 'Caring labour ... a capability in itself' (p.7) and an 'essential capabil-
ity' (p.77). Why would one not call caring labour an essential functioning or activity, or 
9 Sometimes he restricts himself to favourably valued capabilities. Alkire (2002) remarks that this is in-
consistent with everyday usage and leaves no term for describing the non-valued or disvalued. 
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just essential? Perhaps because 'capability' brings connotations of skill, leaming, im-
portance, and of need for protection and promotion. 
We can then have blurring of two types of boundary: between options and ca-
pacities, O- and S-capabilities; and between capabilities and functionings. The result 
seems to be some confusing or even confused usage by others, including in the HDRs 
and by sympathizers. For example: 
11 The 1996 HDR speaks of 'such capabilities as health, knowledge, self-respect' (p.49; al so 
p.54); and of 'health and nutrition. Human development sees these capabilities as ends in 
themselves' (p.55). In normai language each of these things is a functioning (or, in the case 
of knowledge, an S-capability), not an opportunity sets, the HDRs' own definiti on of capa-
bility. The passage seems clearer if we write: 'such capabilities as the options to have 
health, knowledge [etc.]', even though it no longer makes sense in terms of the 'opportu-
nity set' definition. 
• Similarly, the 2000 HDR defines the [0-]capability (set) of a person, and in the next sen-
tence switches to 'capabilities' without further explanation, so one would presume these are 
just the plural, referring to many people (p.17); but the study subsequently uses 'capabili-
ties' to referto diverse aspects of a given person's life. 10 
11 'Human development is the process of enlarging people's choices, by expanding human 
functionings and capabilities', defines the HDR 2000 (p.17). But expansion of 0-
capabilities is simply another description of enlargement of choices, not a means or path 
towards that, so the reference to capabilities is tautologous. It would make sense in terms of 
expanded S-capabilities, but then diverge from the HDR' s own definition. 11 
The HDR's founder himself repeatedly implicitedly used the S- versus 0-
capability distinction. He stressed 'The contrast bet\veen women's capabilities and op-
portunities' and looked forward to 'a fundamental change in the very model of devel-
opment so that human capabilities are built up and human opportunities enlarged' (ul 
Haq, 1998, pp. 208, 212). 
In her capabilities (sic) theory, Martha Nussbaurn has a more explicit and rich 
picture of human beings, and treats S-capabilities and further aspects of human person-
IO Elsewhere it seems to talk of S-capabilities: 'nutrition, education, health care and socialization help 
build the human capabilities on which a person's human development-and society's-will depend' 
(HDR 2000, p.76). Nutrition here builds [S- ?] capabilities and is presumably a process, while the 1996 
HDR (cited above) treated it as a state of affairs and an [O-] capability. 
11 Note also: (a) Elson (1997:57): 'human capabilities which are activities through which people can ex-
press themselves'. (b) Harriss-White (1995: 138): 'because nutriti on is a means to a variety of ends - in 
Sen's words it is a capability'; although nutrition in the sense ofbeing well/better-nourished is a means to 
various ends it is neither an 0-capability set nor an S-capability. 
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ality ( e.g. Nussbaum, 2000). But she also distinguishes 0-capabilities, \Vhich she calls 
'extemal' capabilities; and notes too that S-capabilities are derived from 'basic' (or 
better, 'potential I P-') capabilities, through training and leaming. 12 This trio of con-
cepts, while imperfect, is superior to using a single label for diverse notions. 
Sen has not followed this lead and refined his tem1inology. To change terms 
whose pitfalls one is familiar with and master of may seem unnecessary and disruptive. 
The 0-capability concept has the merit of taking into account constraints and opportu-
nities in the environment as well as persona! powers. Further, the obscurities have not 
prevented valuable work with operational measures of capability (whether variants of 
O- or S-) in the past decade. 13 But the weakly refined terminology derives from an in-
sufficiently refined picture of persons, and leads then not only to confused and confus-
ing usages: it perpetuates the crude picture of persons. And it seems remediable. 
The 'capability' concept rests on the concept of 'functioning'. That spans not 
just many spheres of life, it covers widely different types of aspect. 'Functioning' 
sounds like 'activity': doing, being, operating. But it also covers outcomes of the activ-
ity (including of non-conscious activities) and in fact a series of stages. 'Functionings' 
can mean a) an achieved state (like being without malaria), b) a conscious action to 
achieve the state (taking a malaria pill), c) internal bodily processes/activities (con-
ve1iing the pill to guard against malaria), and d) activities consequent to the achieved 
state (like living longer). 14 Further, the achieved state can include the state of having a 
capability! Even 'utility' can be deemed a valuable functioning, a point long adopted by 
Sen to allow mental states as a family of types of functioning. The functionings space 
also spans all time periods: so the language of functionings covers both 1. health now 
and 2. a long life. Extending Figure 1, we can draw Figure 3 as one scenario, to hint at 
the forest of stages and types of 'functioning' and of moments of choice and use of 'ca-
pabilities'. 
12 Nussbaum's own labels are unsatisfactory. For S-capability she uses 'internal capability', but poten-
tials are also internal. 'Basic' is similarly imprecise and possibly misleading, for one should know basic 
to what. 
13 See Dreze & Sen (1995) as an example, and Sen (1999b) and Robeyns (2000) for surveys. Adequacy 
will depend on the purpose; e.g. for Nussbaum's agenda of identifying basic constitutional principles the 
need for precise measurement might be less. 
14 This ambiguity or plurali!)' is reflected in the label chosen, 'functioning'. In mathematics a function is 
a relationship between inputs/activities and outputs, a mapping; in administration a function is an activity 
or set of activities towards specified outputs; and in everyday language it is the purpose fulfilled, the ollt-
puts achieved, while 'functioning' means activity orto adequately fulfil a role. 
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Given the ambiguity of both 'capability' and the term on which it relies, 
'functioning', and the ample spread of the latter, the distinction between the two is 
sometimes lost. 15 'Functionings' also sounds less appealing, less morally nourishing, than 
'capabilities', so some users drift towards the latter; or \Vhen in doubt, mention both. 16 
Figure 3: Endless Pathways of Functioning and Capability 
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While Sen's C and F terms are vague, they point to useful contrasts: with in-
carne and utility, and between themselves. The C versus F contrast is vital in a liberal 
philosophy where people have rights to opportunities and to then make their own 
choices, mistaken or not, self-oriented or not. Cohen (1993) argued that coverage of a 
range of possible stages between goods/characteristics and utility-including opportu-
nities, activities and various levels of outcomes-by just two terms fits this perspective. 
Most of life is placed under two heads: attainable activities or states, and persona! 
15 In addition when Sen (1999b:75) and HDR 2000 (p.17) define functionings as the valuable things that 
a person 'is actually able to do' I 'can do' (italics added), they are referring to potential functionings, 
farts ofthe various elements ofthe capability set, and they can equally be read as defining capability. 
6 This might explain the tautologous reference to capabilities that we saw in the HDR 2000's definition 
ofhuman development. 
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choices as to whether to use those opportunities. Sen has not felt the need to be more 
specific here; instead he adds the dimension of 'well-being v. agency', \vhich \Ve con-
sider later. His categories tell us to look in certain directions, not only those of main-
stream economics; but they do not previde much further guidance. The discursive space 
which they help open up seems to require more elaborati on. Fora theory of human de-
velopment-for understanding and action, not only evaluative accounting--do we not 
need to say more about 'human', human action, and personhood (Douglas & Ney, 
1998)? 
5. \VELL-BEING AND PERSONHOOD 
Sen noted that 'the utilitarian view of the person' presumes that well-being 
means happiness or preference fulfilment, and that it ignores non self-interest objec-
tives and freedom considerations (1987, p. 58ff). He has offered an alternative that 
seeks to remedy these limitations including by attention to motives of sympathy and 
commitment and to freedom as well as, indeed ahead of, achievement. But he has con-
ducted this exercise as a patching operation on what remains in part, in Talcott Parsons' 
sense, an utilitarian conception of persons and society (Parsons, 193 7). 17 That concep-
tion also included the following: (i) society is a sum of indi1:id11als; Sen seems to retain 
this; (ii) individuals make clzoices: he retains this preoccupation, but with a focus on 
objective outcomes; (iii) .. . and individuals experience and choose according to private 
utility ... : he goes clearly beyond this, but perhaps not comprehensively; (iv) ... which 
rhey (andlor the State at an aggregate leve!) will try to maximize: Sen rejected this last 
element as inadequate. Here we look at the other three elements. 
5.1 \Vell-being 
'Well-being' might mean any evaluation of a person's situation, or, more fit-
tingly, any such evaluation which is focused on the person's 'being'. Sen's version of 
CA has an intermediately complex concept of well-being: the fulfilment of whatever 
own-functionings 'people have reason to value', and especially the freedom to allow 
this. 18 
17 Thus Nussbaum (2000), Gore (1997) and others reject Sen's 'agency'-'\\'ell-being' categorization: they 
share the concern for agency, but feel his concept of 'well-being' retains too much utilitarian baggage. 
18 See Sumner (1996) fora probing examination ofSen's formulation by a philosopher. 
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Some critics doubt whether SCA diverges enough from mainstream economics 
to distance itself from consumerism: the unending addictive quest for fulfilment--or at 
least novelty and distraction-through commodities (Cameron, 2000). Which pleasures 
and values enrich and sustain one, and others? And which disable? Argyle (1987) 
found, for example, in Britain that fulfilling work and quality of family life \vere key 
determinants of felt well-being. Yet if say quality of family life is unrelated to per cap-
ita income or negatively related to it, at least in some cases or some stages or for some 
styles of income gro\vth, then focus on income as the measure of well-being can se-
verely mislead. \Ve can expect that if the HDRs do not measure fulfilling work and 
quality of family life, which could be difficult, they \Vill not provide strong measures of 
well-being. The 1998 HDR reported that 'Many opinion surveys show that people place 
a higher value on community and family life than on acquiring material possessions' 
(pp.12-13 ), yet did not flinch at the prospect that industri al countries' consumption 
might increase four- to five-fold over the next half century (p.8). It implicitly held that 
there is no necessary link from absorption in material possessions to decline in the 
higher valued areas. 
A hardly differentiated utility category may still sometimes lurk, even entitled 
'well-being', in Sen's system: in the contrast between 'sympathy' (where others' bene-
fit brings one feelings of well-being) and 'commitment' (where one supports their 
benefit despite r .. o such impact). Sen refers briefly to 'The variety of motivations that 
we have reason to accommodate' (1999, p. 272), but makes no regular employment of 
differentiations within well-being, for example between pleasure and happiness, or 
types of happiness (Giri, 2000), or Scitovsky's categories of 'comfort' and 'pleasure'. 
Scitovsky's work on consumption and habituation receives no mention in the thousand 
or so references in Development as Freedom; nor for example does Erich Fromm's 
analysis of 'having' versus 'being'. 
The concept of well-being remains underdeveloped here because the theory of 
personhood is underdeveloped too. And so there is no close attention to other mental 
states (unconscious as well as conscious) either. Sympathy and commitment are not 
examined deeply. While sympathy means to feel with or for another, Sen restricts the 
term's scope to exclude ('commitment') cases where one has a concern but is not di-
rectly (dis)comforted - as if such concems were not feelings too and there were only 
one cmTency of feelings (namely, utility). 
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5.2 Personhood - concepts of agency and be-ing 
As part of his critique of utilitarianism, Sen has added 'agency' analysis to, in 
his terms, 'well-being' analysis. Agency objectives and personal 'well-being' objec-
tives are conceived as largely overlapping sets, but significantly non-identica!: one 
wants some things other than one's own pleasure and comfort, and does not want all the 
things that would bring them. A person's quality of life is then defined as a function of 
not only well-being (WBA and WBF), but also of agency freedom and achievement. 
This is one version of what Durkheim called Homo duplex (Douglas & Ney, 1998, 
p.46). So as we saw, in this conception the fulfilment of objectives other than for one's 
own functionings appears not as part of well-being; instead it is part of 'quality of life'. 
In principle, agency analysis can broaden the concept of [O-] capability. A per-
son's 0-capability was defined as the set of attainable functionings vectors/or that per-
son; the category of functioning was the actor' s own functioning. The concept of 
Agency Freedom, rather than Well-Being Freedom, goes further. Its concrete meas-
urement can be difficult though, as seen in the HDI's use ofthe flawed proxy of income 
per capita. 
A deeper concem is that SCA's conception of agency, like that of well-being, 
seems thin. More must be said about agency than that people want things other than 
personal comfort. Sen does stress the centrality of agency for effective change strate-
gies and the felt quality of life: people are not merely patients for treatment but moti-
vated actors whose actions make a difference (e.g. 1999, p.19 and Ch.8). But he 
acknowledges that his exposure to sociology, anthropology, psychology and other so-
cial sciences lacks depth compared to his engagement with philosophy (see e.g. his in-
terview in Swedberg, 1990), and he does not tackle the content of agency. Here, in van 
Staveren' s formulation, actors require a seri es of what she calls moral capabilities (part 
of S-capabilities): to be able to internet with others, and to form purposes and then care 
about, commit to and act on these, and to deliberate about the tensions and balancing 
between different incommensurable values. 
Central to Sen's view is the choosing, reasoning individual, but with little fur-
ther specified content of being human ( cf. Bauman, 1988). Though he refers also to 
rule-led behaviour and the constraints set by socially constructed meaning systems, and 
to individuals within families, the dominant impression is of people as choosers, their 
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formation only lightly treated, rather than as actors more broadly. 19 Yet a way of life is 
more than a set of private choices; and personality and identity have a psychic and so-
cial grounding. 
Two important foci in such debate have concemed: Is the CA overly individu-
alistic or can it grasp and employ the idea of 'social exclusion'? Should CA explicitly 
specify central human capabilities? We consider these in turn. 
Some social scientist critics see the focus on the generalized 'human' as a way 
to avoid talking about the situated socia!. C.T. Kurien has argued that the lack of a so-
cial framework in Sen's analysis-his abstracted individualism-diverts him into try-
ing to upgrade the details of mainstream economics and renders his work unreliable as 
policy advice. Perhaps reacting to such criticisms, Sen's new study of 'social exclusion' 
reserves that term for the relational (i.e. concerning the relations between people) 
causes and processes from which some people suffer deprivations (2000a, p. 9). Unlike 
with functionings, here he marks a process-result distinction by differentiated labels. 
He withholds the exclusion term from other cases even though they involve the, vita!, 
result of exclusion from full membership of a community. Or is it vital? For Sen it still 
appears to have a secondary status. He focuses on impacts, if any, of relational proc-
esses and community membership or exclusion therefrom, upon the range of valued 
choices open to an individual. Community membership is taken as instrumental not 
centra! to being.20 
Somewhat in contrast, the market mechanism receives the accolade of 'a basic 
arrangement through which people can interact with each other, and undertake mutually 
advantageous activities. Thus seen it is very hard to appreciate how any reasonable 
cri tic could be against the market mechanism in genera!' (Sen, 2000a, p. 33). Y et while 
markets have massive virtues, the broad objections to them are no mystery. Member-
ship in markets is defined by the amount of exchangeable resources or money one has 
or can access as credit; thus markets exclude. Further, commoditization dehumanizes in 
19 This perspective is strong in the 1998 HDR on consumption, for example in its thesis that 'the key' to 
'enabling the consumer to decide which choices are best' is information (p.43; emphasis added). Anand 
and Sen wrote a lead concept paper for this HDR. In Swedberg (1990), Sen outlined more complex ideas 
of personhood as a composite of identities from different group memberships, which he planned to ex-
giore in a book on Rationality and Society. 
o In Doyal & Gough's theory of need, ability to fully participate as a member of one's society is a key 
integrative criterion for judging the quality of human agency. They and Gough & Thomas (1994) offer a 
carefully theorized and tested adaptation of SCA terms, and a larger theoretical and empirica! framework. 
See Gas per ( 1996) for a discussi on. 
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various ways; and it generates concentrations of wealth \Vhich may come to dominate 
all spheres of life. 
Even if one keeps to an instrumental view of community, one might hold that 
the link betv.:een inclusion and well-being is so major and universal that community 
(and/or family) membership deserves separate mention as a dimension of human devel-
opment, as granted now in the HDRs. A further ground could be if not mentioning a 
vital instrument brings danger of its neglect. Strictly speaking however, separate men-
tion implies more than instrumental status: that community membership (or affiliation, 
in Nussbaum's more flexible and nuanced formulation) is a universal good in itself, not 
just a handy instrument for giving individuals more valued options. People are seen as 
requiring affiliation. Perhaps this good can be described as a valued option, but if peo-
ple without affiliation are harmed to such an extent as to no longer meet a conception of 
decent humanity, then to call it an option becomes misleading. However Sen eschews 
explicit listing of features as core requirements, other than physical subsistence and, 
one may say, freedom. 
The CA is ethically individualistic in the sense that it assesses states of affairs 
only with respect to properties of individuals, notes Gore ( 1997). He advocates that 
sin ce the content, meaning, and value of many functionings of persons depends on the 
cultural context (systems of language, norms, institutions), those systems have intrinsic 
value and one should not take isolated aspects of persons as the only objects of value. 
Since we should reject methodological individualism, so we should reject ethical indi-
vidualism, runs the argument. Robeyns (2000) denies CA is methodologically or onto-
logically individualistic. But it is in any case not clear that rejection of methodological 
individualism obliges rejection of ethical individualism; or even that SCA is exclu-
sively ethically individualistic.21 Whether SCA is or is not, should or should not be, any 
of these things, the underlying concem that emerges as one ponders such issues is 
rather that it uses a thin picture of persons ( cf. Stevens, 1996), and so gives a thin and 
often insufficient basis for a theory of well-being and human development. This is a 
separate issue too from the defence of reason, secularism and cross-cultural learning, 
where Sen ( e.g. 1999c) performs doughty and insightful servi ce, showing that much of 
21 For Sen, the 'reasons to value' that people use will certainly depend on their culture, and he seems in 
genera! to accept their reasons (though not always). Since in some cultures the objects of value include 
features of systems, perhaps CA can have ethically quasi- non-individualist variants (e.g. 'I value the 
capability to live in a society that continues the traditions ofmy forefathers'). 
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the vaunted 'discovery' of identity is through (fallible) reasoning. Nussbaum does 
similar service but from a more substantial basis. 
Sen declines, for carefully considered reasons, to present or even discuss a list 
of central capabilities; but that would be one path to thinking further beyond choice-
utility-freedom frameworks. Nussbaum, for example, through that exercise conveys and 
stimulates a richer picture of aspects of being human (for example in her attention now 
to religion), whether or not one agrees with her particular formulations and prioritiza-
tions. She takes us much further from the world of the economie man of no specified 
and varied emotions: no friendship, emnity, pride and anger, loves and fears. 
Giri and van Staveren see in Sen's CA a one-sided focus on reason and a rela-
tive neglect of the emotions and empathy, the emotional experience and maturation, 
required for and norma! to human life. Reason by itself is not enough to sustain a rea-
sonable society. That 'requires a far fuller appreciation and acceptance and invitation of 
the other into one's ovm' writes Giri (2000, p. 1014), who argues that the still strong 
self-as-distinct-from-other contrast which Sen uses becomes limiting. Thus Sen's sym-
pathy and commitment categories may as yet figure like optional extras in the schema, 
not as essential parts of a healthy human being; and so his discussi on of what can pro-
mote them comes rather in passing (Sen, l 999b ). The idea that the self needs sympathy 
and commitment towards 'itself likewise remain peripheral (Sen, 1999c; Giri, 2000). 
In Sen's picture, the agent's well-being consists of fulfilment of those purposes 
she has reason to value. What if those values are misplaced, \Vhat if they neglect much 
that is vital (affiliation, family life, community involvements) ? In the tradition of wel-
fare economics, SCA does not involve an empirica! investigation of what actually 
brings well-being and of what sorts. It is centrally a set of propositions about the space 
for evaluation (components 1 to 4 in the list in Section 3 above), espousing a different 
set from that presupposed in mainstream welfare economics but sharing with it a 
maxim of the predominant importance of choice, beyond which relatively little empiri-
cal investigation is needed.22 
Giri and Carmen hold further that Sen's 0-capability approach has not attended 
to capability dynamics, the self-development potential of persons or the potential for 
mobilized, group leaming; and that it, so far at least, connects insufficiently to building 
22 In mainstream economics, choice is presumed to reflect preference and/or to give maximum attainable 
utility. 
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capacity for personal and social action, change and transfonnation. Its conception of 
capability remains vacuous, a liberal shell rather than a liberationist map. 
Sen argues that the incompleteness of his CA is in some respects a merit, leav-
ing it not required to declare answers \vhere none are (yet) available, compatible with 
various schools of thought, and hospitable to public debate. However, while the ab-
sence of a theory of personhood and agency is a deficiency rather than a defect, com-
patibility with defective theories-such as Economie Man-would be no virtue; and we 
saw residues of that theory ensconced in the spaces left in SCA by lack of a more con-
scious and elaborate theory of the person. 
Would SCA have to change much to become of greater interest in a conversa-
tion with non-economist social scientists? The various gaps and deficiencies in con-
ceptualizing \vell-being and personhood might well be remediable to give something 
that remains recognizably a variant or descendant of CA. Some other authors on capa-
bilities and human development-perhaps including sections of the HDRs fertilized by 
the richer Basic Human Needs tradition and the study of care-go further than Sen. 
Irene van Staveren's The Values of Economics is an important example, which could be 
subtitled: 'Adding attention to care, will, emotion, deliberation, and interaction, to hu-
manize economics and human development theory'. A significant emergent research 
programme exists in such areas, on the content of both agency and well-being, and their 
reflection in welfare evaluation and public policy deliberation. 
6. FREEDOM 
Sen's work seems to centre now on 'development as freedom'. His book ofthat 
name stresses the instrumental roles of both negative and positive freedom, while the 
Human Development Report 2000, for which he provided the conceptual framework, 
posits that 'Human freedom is the common purpose and common motivati on of human 
rights and human development' (p.2). Everyone is assumed to prioritize freedom, if 
they are rational. 
Sen is explicit that values of justice and care can and should be part of persons' 
agency objectives and commitments, and that CA does not provide or substitute for a 
fuller theory of justice, which must heed many other types of information. There are 
some grounds for concem however about the manner of his prioritization and concep-
tualization of freedom. 
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6.1 The relative importance of 'freedom' and Iiving: capability versus fune-
tionings 
CA has always been oriented to 'positive freedom', the possibility to do. While 
granting that capability is not the only relevant focus in evaluation, Sen stresses capa-
bility, ability to do various things, more than functionings, what is actually done.23 Is 
this evaluative stress on capability excessive? When Dreze & Sen ( 1995) repeatedly 
stress the importance of 'being clear about ends and means' (e.g. p.12), downgrading 
economie grewth and income as ultimate ends, should we follow them when they exalt 
[0-]capability, above or even regardless offunctionings (e.g. p.13)? 
Consider the components of the Human Development Index. The component of 
GDP per capita (adjusted for purchasing power) measures capability not functionings; 
it questionably takes income as a prexy for all other capabilities than those primarily 
determined by education and health. Conceming the other components, do we value 
health and education because 1. they previde capability for choice, or 2. they previde 
capability for a good life, or 3. for themselves? Education possibly is more valued as 
supporting capability, though also very often as good in itself. Health surely is substan-
tially valued for itself: as a functioning or functionings. It may be taken as a prexy for 
many dependent capabilities, but this is not all: health is important in itself, not merely 
for its effects on other things (which could be compensated for by various means). 
Consider too the issue of consumerism and the possible limits to human devel-
opment from societal preoccupation with material opulence. A theory of human devel-
opment must attend to functionings-how people actually spend their lives and are 
affected by their consumption-not only 0-capabilities, how they notionally could live 
with all the information, technology and preducts available to them. Studies show the 
extent of, for example, prefessional over-work and mass addiction to television and 
pomography in high 0-capability countries. Overemphasis on choice compared to 
achievements could become a reductive focus, counter to Sen's long-term thrust to 
validate many types of information besides utility levels. 
Sen takes functionings as the category that reflects the concern for how people 
actually live, and capability as reflecting the concem that we should consider how free 
23 See e.g. Sen, 2000, pp. 3-4, 24, 29. HO\vever we saw that the HDR 2000's Glossary (p.17) defines 
human development, if somewhat obscurely, in terms of both capabilities and functionings. It adds: 
'Human development thus also reflects human outcomes in these functionings and capabilities' (p.17). 
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people are, \vhat real options they have in terms of functionings. But freedom should 
also be assessed by looking directly at functionings. Freedom does not mean only the 
ability to be healthy, but actually being healthy, not mentally and physically infirm, free 
of infirmity. And how sufficient would be a conception of freedom that ranks highly an 
educated, well-paid, still physically healthy person habituated, perhaps even addicted, 
to 30-40 hours of television and video-viewing per week? 
The prioritization in Sen' s CA of capability over functionings can however be 
understood as a proposed policy principle rather than as a theory of well-being: a prin-
ciple that we should leave people to decide for themselves about if and how to use a 
capability, whether or not their choices bring them well-being or goal fulfilment. 
6.2 \Vhat does freedom mean? More than the range of (valued) choice 
For Sen, capability means the range of (valued) attainable functionings n-tuples/ 
vectors/packages, and represents the extent of positive freedom. A series of grey and 
problem areas arise for this (RO(V)C, range of valued choice) concept of positive free-
dom.24 
First, there can be difficulties in specifying the meaning of 'attainable'; for ex-
ample, attainable under what assumptions about ability to perceive opportunities, abil-
ity to formulate choices, ability to make choices, and ability to act ? These obscurities 
attach to the concept of freedom andare not specific to the capabilities formulation; and 
\vhile they sometimes become serious are not fondamenta! for our present purpose. 
Second, education comes to have a special priority, like health, so that people 
not only have the opportunity to become educated but use it. Those various capabilities 
(in the substantive S-capability sense) to perceive, formulate, reflect, choose and act 
must be in place before a range-of-(valued-)choice conception of freedom makes sense. 
Otherwise there is the danger that every expansion of the range of trivia or nonsense 
available for purchase, and every loss of moral inhibition, becomes automatically seen 
as an extension of human freedom and human development. Sen do es stress agency as-
pects of being, but arguably underplays the skills and personality formati on required for 
choice as opposed to bondage and, in Ananta Giri's terms, for self-nurturance, self-
development, self-extension and self-transcendence, including for assuming responsi-
bility and not only demanding freedom (Giri, 2000). 
24 Sen certainly also puts value on negative freedom (e.g. Sen, 1985). 
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Third, not merely is possession of substantive capabilities to formulate, choose 
and so on a prerequisite for the RO(V)C conception to have plausibility, and not guar-
anteed, it is in danger of being undermined by the RO(V)C conception. There are two 
levels of choice: a) the busy comparisons of the consumer in the emporium; and b) the 
level from which the busy consumer may be eternally diverted - including the choice 
not to busy oneself with trivia. This is part of an explanation of the Easterlin paradox, 
the lack of evidence that higher wealth produces sustained higher happiness or satisfac-
tion. If some needs remain not recognised or fulfilled then we get the illusion of limit-
lessness of ( especially materia!) desires, as substitutes are sought endlessly and in vain. 
A theory of capability not linked to a theory of need might be hollow and liable to 
mislead (cf. Hamilton, 1999; Walsh, 2000). 
The HDR 1998 starts from the principle that we 'must aim at extending and im-
proving consumer choices too, but in ways that promote human life' (p. l ). So we re-
quire criteria for promotion that go beyond choice alone, in other words some 
conception of good human life. But its conceptual framework chapter tiptoes with ex-
traordinary brevity past a few theories of consumption, then simply declares that 'This 
Report uses the understanding generated by all the perspectives to explore the impact of 
consumption on human lives from many angles' (p.40) and adopts the principle of con-
sumer sovereignty without delimitation of its appropriate scope. HDR 1998 puts relig-
ions' warnings against materia! desires into a box, and skirts these too. 
Desire is sometimes bondage. In South Africa, the current spreading of large ca-
sinos countrywide raises people's range of choices, formally speaking. New casinos are 
helpfully located within easy reach of the major population concentrations, the black 
townships, and subsidized bus services are provided. This is accompanied by a rise of 
compulsive gambling, with damage to families and many of the gamblers. 25 Thus some 
other conceptions of freedom concern contro! of desire and renunciation of illusion, 
through the understanding of causation, 'the recognition of necessity'. A conception of 
freedom could require a conception of reason. 
Fourthly, even given the prerequisite substantive capabilities for choice, ranking 
situations according to the range of choice provided-so that e.g. the more sexual part 
25 
'A study by the Human Sciences Research Council, a think-tank, found that poor punters were losing 
more than they could afford, and that one gambler in seven borrowed to bet. .. The officiai line is that 
gambling is better legai.' (The Economist, Aprii 7t\ 200 I.) 
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ners one can choose the better-would not be fully convincing. What one is choosing 
bet\veen is important. The HDRs and Sen stress valued choices ( e.g. HDR 1996, p. 49: 
'people's capabilities to lead the lives they value'); but apart from cases when people's 
values are immature-as for the half ofhumanity that are children-what ofwhere values 
are t\visted, for example as in the cases Sen used to query the criterion of felt utility? Sen 
habitually refers to what one 'has reason to value'; for example in his chapter in the HDR 
2000 (p.20): 'The human development approach is concemed, ultimately, with all the ca-
pabilities that people have reason to value'. This flexible, ambiguous, potentially populist 
phrase, if left with no criterion for what is good reason, could represent a liberal 'choice 
for choice'. Further judgements on what it is to be human are left for choice by - 'peo-
ple'? Some people have reasons to value killing their enemies and the 'defiled'. Here 
again other authors-including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
HDRs themselves \Vith their de facto lists of basic needs/rights-have more to say. In 
fact SCA's distancing from felt utility, and its concern to provide other criteria for allo-
cation or steering in public policy, make it less populist than its language sometimes 
suggests. 
Fifthly, choice can be costly and a burden. Hypertrophy of options need not in-
crease well-being, even if one has strong S-capabilities to skim, scan and select. Sen 
observes this on occasion (e.g. 1992, pp. 59, 63), and could reply that the ways of life 
in the attainable set are inclusive of the choices they involve and the associated costs 
and stresses. The point remains that adding more choices can be undesirable, when ei-
ther A. it ties one up in excess choice processes, or B. more radically, it distracts one 
and distorts one's personality, not just diverts an unchanged personality. Case A can be 
fomrnlated to fit a RO(V)C conception; case B might undermine it. 
Sixthly, freedom as the ability to achieve more and more is insufficient if others' 
freedom is not considered. Sen is strongly oriented to this point but, remarks Giri, his 
versi on of CA does not help much here. Its picture of agents is too thin to characterize, 
explain or promote sympathy and commitment. A human development approach needs 
more. 
7. ROLES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE CAPABILITY APPROACH 
The capability approach helps to broaden economics beyond commodities and 
open it to more interdisciplinary cooperation (Gasper, 2000b ); it stimulates useful em-
pirical work and policy initiatives. This combination of contributions is rare. One 
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wishes then to be clear on how to upgrade or complement CA, reduce mishandling, and 
assist evolution on to an improved next generation or successor. 
The first and greatest role of Sen's CA is in the battle against productionism and 
obsession with GNP, by opening doors for more types of informati on, and stressing that 
how people li ve (the category of functionings) is more important than what they eam or 
spend. It is not the only route to that destination, but has helped many more people to 
reach it. SCA is a great advance over mainstream economics welfare theory, let alone 
the GNP/GDP worship in some economie policymaking. To be operational, simplified 
versions are needed, and CA provides the basis for a workable alternative set of pro xi es 
and indicators which surpass those in mainstream economics. Like all approaches, it 
can become a frozen substitute for thought, a new liturgy. But it can also function as a 
fruitful set of prompts towards creative examination of issues and situations. 
The second main role has been to stress via the category of [0-]capability the 
value of freedom, the right to make one's own choices, judicious or mistaken. Here 
GDP per capita re-enters in the HDI, as a (flawed) proxy for agency freedom. By pri-
oritizing the capability category CA goes further, but this prioritization is to be under-
stood as a policy principle rather than as a theory of well-being: a stance that we should 
leave people to decide for themselves, whether or not this brings them well-being. Even 
if everyone in their O\Vn !ife gave normative priority to the leve! of functionings, in the 
public arena a one-step back conception is often required. 
These broad contributions from CA are particularly useful for say an economist 
in a Ministry of Finance or aid agency, to think beyond economie growth, even distri-
bution-adjusted growth. They are relevant but not sufficient for policy makers, creators, 
planners, managers or evaluators in any sector. For finer grade tasks we need finer 
toothed combs. 
Sections 4 through 6 have suggested that SCA's theory of personhood and the 
self give an insufficient basis for theory and policy-making towards human develop-
ment and well-being. A thinnish theory of personhood, including an underdeveloped 
picture oftypes of mental state, can contribute to (and then in some cases be reinforced 
by): unsatisfactory choices of terms, underdeveloped pictures of both well-being and 
agency, and an overstated and potentially monotheistic normative program of strong 
priority to an insufficiently refined conception of positive freedom. A conception of 
freedom requires also conceptions of reason and need. Given the limits to the range-of-
valued-choice (ROVC) conception of freedom, attention to well-being requires a major 
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emphasis on functionings, not exclusively or predominantly on capabilities in ROVC 
terms. The treatment of functionings needs a Frommian attenti on to be-ing, not only to 
havings defined as be-ings. The treatment of agency needs to be more than an add-on to 
a still partially utilitarian conception of well-being. Without such deepening, 'Human 
Dewlopment' conceived as ever greater [O-] capability risks becoming absorbed into 
the hegemony of commodity production and consumerism. 
Diane Elson (1997) has captured severa! key trends and issues for Human De-
velopment theory, in terms close to Apthorpe's and van Staveren's. The HD work has 
valuably moved beyond the narrow and often unrealistic views of people in neoclassi-
ca! economics, 'new grov..rth theory' and discussions of 'human capitai'. It sees people 
as multi-dimensionai but limited agents, and as the ends and not only the means for de-
velopment. It needs to go further, to view people as actors bearing multiple social roles, 
and cultures, beyond those of consumer, investor, chooser. Fig. 4 summarizes her 
points. 
Figure 4: Trends and Issues for Human Development Theory 
From seeing people as: To seeing thern as: 
(i) rnasterful choosers arnongst given (iii) having changeable, socially intluenced, 
possibilities (the view in standard possibilities, and differing, changeable, 
neoclassica! econornics ); capacities for choice; (the HD school) 
and/or and 
(ii) as deployers of and investors in 'human (iv) as people, producers, group members, 
capitai' assets (themselves) which are no culture bearers, men/wornen, old/young, 
different from any other assets (the new parents/children ... (extending the HD 
growth theory view); school). 
With Giri and van Staveren she reminds us that: 'it is not enough to call for 
more public investment in health and education, and. more incarne transfers to offset 
entitlement failure. It is necessary also to examine the nature of the social institutions 
through which persona! care is provided to those who cannot care for themselves . 
... The key issue is how to synthesize individua! self-realization and concern for others. 
How can we avoid the enlargement of individuai choices leading to selfishness and a 
decline in community values and responsibilities?' (Elson, 1997, pp. 66-7). 
CA has helped open up a territory for investigation, within which we see much 
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valuable work (see: Robeyns; Alkire, Comim & Qizilbash). \Ve need to distinguish ver-
sions, including: the simpler versions expressed in the HDRs, which yet sometimes also 
go beyond Sen; the version(s) Sen uses for many working purposes; his full system of 
thought, including much besides CA; Martha Nussbaum's alternative; and further work. 
How much long-term advance these versions and the whole approach will allow must 
simply remain to be seen. 
Ul Haq warned that 'stagnant ideas die quickly ... It is critical, therefore, that the 
intellectual evolution in the human development area be stimulated further.... [The] 
human development ideas ... should be debated, criticized, brutalized and evolved fur-
ther in many directions' (1998, p. 225). Sen joins the call to keep HD a dynamic 
stream, as ul Haq did, 'not a stagnant pool' (Sen, 2000b, p. 23). CA may require peri-
odic anti-freeze, and additional inputs different in type from Sen's. I have found the 
work of, for example, Carmen, Doyal & Gough, Nussbaum and van Staveren helpful. 
The latter for example greatly extends the insights in Sen's famous 'Rational Fools: A 
Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economie Theory'-by drawing on actual, 
varied, extensive behavioural evidence. Human development theory in turn requires 
additional bases besides CA, such as from the work of Giri, Maslow and Max-Neef. 
23). Making and keeping various channels of communication open, being a broad(er) 
forum and still a research programme, is the challenge ahead for human development 
theory. 
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